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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACTS OF THE KOSOVO WAR 
ON NATO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES 
 
Ateş, Emin 
M.B.A., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Aydın Yüksel 
September 2002 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of the Kosovo War on 
the NATO countries defense industry stocks. The data set covers daily prices of 
stocks of 34 U.S., 12 U.K., 7 French and 3 Turkish companies, totaling 56 
defense stocks. The analysis is conducted by using both standard event study 
methodology and multivariate regression model. The study provides evidence 
that the defense stocks reacted positively and significantly to the Kosovo War. 
The study shows that there is a significant difference between the abnormal 
returns of the U.S. defense stocks and European defense stocks. However, the 
analysis proves that there is no significant difference between the abnormal 
returns of aerospace stocks and non-aerospace defense stocks. 
Keywords: The Kosovo War, event study, defense industry, multivariate 
regression model 
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ÖZET 
 
KOSOVA SAVAŞININ 
NATO SAVUNMA SANAYİLERİNE ETKİSİ 
 
 
Emin ATEŞ 
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.Doç. Dr. Aydın Yüksel 
Eylül, 2002 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı Kosova Savaşının NATO ülkelerinin savunma 
sanayi hisselerine olan etkilerini araştırmaktır.Örneklem 34 Amerikan, 12 
İngiliz, 7 Fransız ve 3 Türk olmak üzere 56 savunma sanayi şirketinden 
oluşmaktadır. Analizler olay etki çalışması ve çok değişkenli regresyon modeli 
ile yapılmıştır. Çalışma savunma sanayi hisselerinin Kosova Savaşı’na olumlu 
ve belirgin bir şekilde tepki gösterdiğini bulmuştur. Ayrıca çalışma, Amerikan 
ve Avrupalı şirketlerin anormal getirileri arasında belirgin bir fark olduğunu 
göstermiştir. Ancak, havacılık şirketleri ve diğer sektörlerdeki şirketlerin 
anormal getirileri arasında belirgin bir fark bulunamamıştır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kosova Savaşı,olay etki çalışması, savunma sanayi, çok 
değişkenli regresyon modeli 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1989, the first sparks of the Kosovo conflict are seen when the autonomy 
of the region is removed. After nine years, the conflict turned into an ethnic 
cleansing. NATO had to intervene the conflict for the stability of the region. 
Although the cost of the war was high, it created new opportunities for 
marketing and selling defense products. Therefore, it is expected that the war 
affected defense industry firms positively. During the war, the superiority of U.S. 
products was observed. The feature of the Kosovo War is that it was mainly an air 
campaign. So it is expected that U.S. firms and aerospace firms benefited more than 
European firms and the firms that are not in the aerospace industry. 
In this study, the impacts of the Kosovo War on NATO member countries’ 
defense stocks are investigated by using event study methodology. This is the first 
study that investigates the financial impacts of Kosovo War. 
Event studies measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm by 
using financial market data (MacKinlay 1997).  They are concerned with measuring 
abnormal returns around the date of the specific event.  The role of news as 
determinant of stock returns has been the subject of interest, because efficient market 
hypothesis assumes that stock returns fully reflect all available information and 
adjust immediately to the arrival of new information.  (Shapiro 1999)  Thus, a 
measure of the event’s economic event impact can be constructed using security 
prices observed over a relatively short time period. 
 2 
In order to measure the effects of this war on the defense firms of NATO 
countries, first the standard event study methodology is employed. The cumulative 
abnormal returns obtained are used to interpret the general effects of the Kosovo 
War. 
As events, wars are similar to regulatory changes. The first similarity is that 
there is no single event date like those in merger announcements or stock splits. 
There are many days until the beginning of the war that increase the expectations of a 
war. The second similarity is that the event date is same for all firms and all of the 
firms are in the same industry. Same event date and the same industry issues create 
statistical problems that challenge the adequacy of using standard event study 
methodology to examine these types of events. Therefore, ten important dates were 
chosen and then Jaffe Standardized Residual Test (JSR) and Multivariate Regression 
Model (MVRM) are employed to deal with these problems. 
The results of the analysis show that, defense companies reacted to the 
Kosovo War. The evidence indicates that the stocks of defense companies reacted 
positively and significantly to the attack of the Serbian Army to Albania. There is a 
significant difference in the reactions of U.S. and European firms portfolios to this 
event. However, the difference in the reactions of aerospace firms and the firms in 
other sectors is not significant.  
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CHAPTER 2 
   
THE KOSOVO WAR & NATO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES 
 
 
This chapter starts with a brief review of the Kosovo War. The rest of the 
discussion focuses on two major observations regarding the military capabilities of 
NATO member countries and the importance of the aerospace division within the 
defense industry.   
 
2.1 The Kosovo War: Review and results 
 
Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population of which the 
majority is ethnic Albanians.  Until 1989, the region had a high degree of autonomy 
within the former Yugoslavia.  In 1989, Serbian leader Milosevic altered the status of 
the region by removing its autonomy.  Then, Kosovar Albanians were exposed to 
discrimination, since they opposed to the removal of autonomy.  After nine years, 
discrimination turned into a systematic violent ethnic cleansing, and 1,500 Kosovar 
Albanians were killed and 400,000 people were forced to leave their homes in 19981.   
These incidents led to the first international meeting for the Kosovo conflict, 
which was held on 28 May 1998 by foreign ministers of NATO countries.  The next 
meeting was held on 12 June 1998 by the NATO Council.  The alternative of solving 
the problem by a military operation was first consulted in this meeting.  Following 
the deterioration of situation, on 13 October 1998, the NATO council authorized 
                                                 
1 Source: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm 
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Activation Orders2 for air strikes.  At the last moment, the Serbian government 
agreed to comply and air strikes were called off. 
Despite all past efforts, the situation in Kosovo flared up again at the 
beginning of 1999.  Renewed international efforts were made to give new political 
impetus to the solution of the conflict.  For this reason, the six-nation Contact Group3 
and NATO declared the agreement on air strikes.  Subsequently, the six-nation 
Contact Group established meetings in Paris, in February and March 1999.  At the 
end of these meetings, the Kosovar Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace 
agreement, but the talks broke up without the signature of the Serbian delegation.  
Immediately afterwards, Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity 
of their operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 
After a final ultimatum to Serbia, either to stop attacks or to face imminent 
NATO air strikes, which the Serbian government refused to comply with, the final 
order was given to start the air strikes on 23 March. 
After an air campaign lasting seventy-eight days, the full withdrawal of 
Serbian forces from Kosovo began in June 1999.  On the same day, the United 
Nations Security Council passed a resolution welcoming the acceptance by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the 
Kosovo crisis. 
The Kosovo War was the largest combat operation in the history of NATO.  
Its cost was $ 49.27 billion.  Only military costs reached to $ 4 billion.   
During the conflict, NATO: 
                                                 
2 It is an order to be ready to attack when the final order is given. 
3 The sixnation Contact Group consists of France, Italy, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom and 
United States 
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• Dropped more than 23,000 bombs and missiles  
• Spent more than $ 225 million on fuel in the first week  
• Destroyed almost half of the Yugoslavia’s industrial production  
• Caused $ 2.61 billion damage to the Yugoslavian economy, according to 
Serbian experts.4 
 
Table 14 
Final Cost of Kosovo War 
THE WAR $ 4.09 bn. 
AID $ 3.95 bn. 
PEACEKEEPING $ 9.33 bn. 
RECONSTRUCTION $ 31.89 bn. 
TOTAL $ 49.27 bn. 
 
Table 1 decomposes the components of the total cost of the Kosovo War.  It 
shows that the most important cost is reconstruction cost for the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and it is approximately 32 billion dollars.  The costs for United Nations 
and other countries are about 13 billion dollars as the sum of aid and peace keeping 
costs. The cost of the war is approximately 4 billion dollars for NATO. 
When the war is reviewed, two important observations can be made.  Firstly, 
the gap between the military capabilities of the U.S. and its allies became clear.  
Secondly, it was the first instance, in which victory was won only by air forces.  
These issues will be covered in the next two sections in more detail. 
 
 
                                                 
 
4 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_476000/476134.stm 
 6 
 2.2 U.S. and European Defense Industries Comparison 
 
The Kosovo conflict made U.S. material and technological dominance within 
the NATO Alliance significantly apparent.  In fact, the main reason is not that 
Europe lacks the military technological talents of the United States.  The real causes 
of the gap are the disparity in their military spendings, and the differential treatment 
of the defense industry by the U.S. administration. 
When the first reason is examined, it will be seen that there is a huge 
difference between the defense expenditures of the U.S. and European countries.  
Table 2 displays the annual defense expenditures of the U.S. and Europe as a whole. 
Table 2 
Annual Defense Expenditures of NATO Members 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total NATO Europe (US $) 186.821 172.732 175.306 179.671 164.559 
      
United States (US $) 271.417 276.324 274.278 280.969 296.373 
      
Total NATO (US $) 466.681 456.879 457.112 468.960 468.999 
      
Note: Numbers are X 100.000     
Total NATO Europe is the sum of 16 European Countries’ Expenditures  
Total NATO is the sum of Total NATO Europe, United States and Canada 
Expenditures      
 
According to Table 2, the U.S.’s expenditures are almost twice the sum of 16 
European countries’ expenditures.  It should be taken into consideration that the U.S. 
spends 60% of this money on research and development (R&D) activities5.  The 
money spent by the U.S. on R&D is equal to total military expenditures of all 
                                                 
5 http://www.northgrum.com/news/rev_mag/review09_12_3.html 
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Europe.  Therefore, U.S. material and technology is more advanced than those of 
Europeans.  This gives U.S. defense companies an advantage over European defense 
companies in the international arms market.  
The second reason of the gap is the governmental support to the defense 
industry companies in the U.S.  If it is investigated, it can be noticed that unlike its 
intension to limit mergers in other industries through the use of the antitrust law, U.S. 
government encourages mergers in the defense industry. Because U.S. Department of 
Defense is both the principal buyer and the main regulator of the defense industry, 
mergers in the defense industry raise complex competition policy issues that are not 
easily resolved by applying conventional antitrust merger analysis techniques. 
(Kovacic and Smallwood 1994).  Therefore, the issue that the U.S. pays attention to 
is not the cost, but the competence and technological superiority of the materials.  
This stimulates the companies to manufacture innovative products.   
Table 3 shows the major arms used in the Kosovo War.  Although we do not 
have data on how $ 4.1 billions spent on weapons is allocated among the defense 
companies of different countries, we can predict that the U.S. encouraged the use of 
weapons produced by its own companies. 
Depending on the disparities mentioned above, it is likely that there is a 
difference between U.S. and European defense industry companies regarding the 
impact of the Kosovo War on them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Table 3 
Major Arms Used In The Kosovo War 
 
Name Type Producer 
E-3 Sentry C3a Aircraft U.S. 
F-117 A Stealth Fighter Aircraft U.S. 
F-16 Fighter Aircraft U.S. 
F-15 Fighter Aircraft U.S. 
B-52 Bombardment Aircraft U.S. 
B-1 BOMBER Bombardment Aircraft U.S. 
B-2 Bombardment Aircraft U.S. 
Tomahawk Cruise Missile U.S. 
AGM-65 Maverick Guided Missile (ATS)b U.S. 
AGM-86 C Guided Missile U.S. 
AGM-88 Guided Missile (ATS) U.S. 
GBU-15 Glide Weapon U.S. 
AGM-130 A Guided Missile (ATS) U.S. 
GR-7 Harrier Fighter Aircraft U.K. 
Sidewinder Guided Missile U.K. 
L-1011 TriStar Cargo Aircraft U.K. 
Jaguar Fighter Aircraft U.K.  & France 
Tornado Fighter Aircraft U.K. 
KC-130 Tanker Aircraft Spain 
KC-10 Cargo Aircraft Spain 
        Source: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/kosovo_costs990326.html 
          a. Command, control and communication 
          b. From Air To Surface   
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2.3 Aerospace Industry 
 
The Kosovo War became exclusively an air campaign6.  Unlike a traditional 
military conflict, there was no direct clash of massed military forces.  Air attacks 
lasted 78 days on selected strategic targets to degrade the ability of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) military to perform its functions.  The Kosovo War, 
therefore, became the first instance in which victory had been realized through the 
exclusive application of air power. 
The developments and changes in technology affected warfare strategies and 
tactics.  The most important component of military power is the air forces in our age.  
Therefore, it can be observed that the aircraft development absorbs much of the 
defense spending of countries7.  This directly influences aerospace industry financial 
figures.   
Depending on the structure of the Kosovo War, it is likely that there is a 
difference between the aerospace industry companies and the companies in non-
aerospace industries regarding the impact of the Kosovo War on them. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Table 3 demonstrates the arms used in the Kosovo War and it can be easily seen that it consists of 
aircrafts and missiles.  
7 http://www.fool.com/dripport/1999/dripport990929.htm 
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CHAPTER 3 
  
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, the market efficiency concept is covered first as a background 
for event studies. Next, a brief discussion of event study literature is presented.  A 
review of the event studies examining the impacts of wars and military actions 
concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1 Market Efficiency 
 
Market efficiency implies that stock prices reflect all available relevant 
information in the market.  A capital market is said to be efficient, if it fully and 
correctly reflects all relevant information in determining security prices. 
Fama (1970) presented three strictly increasing degrees of information 
processing efficiency, based on how much of the available public and private 
information market prices are expected to reflect.   
In the weak-form efficiency, asset prices incorporate all historical 
information.  This form of efficiency implies that trading strategies based on analyses 
of historical pricing trends or relationships cannot consistently yield excess returns to 
investors.  Since prices are “memoryless”, they are unforecastable, and will only 
change in response to the arrival of new information.  This implies that asset prices 
follow a random walk, meaning that there is no correlation between subsequent price 
changes, and the asset prices fluctuate randomly and unpredictably. 
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In semi-strong form efficiency, asset prices incorporate all publicly available 
information.  The level of asset prices should reflect all relevant historical, current 
and forecastable future information that can be obtained from public sources.  Also 
in this form of efficiency, asset prices should change fully and instantaneously in 
response to the arrival of relevant new information.  The key point about this form of 
efficiency is that it only requires information that can be collected from public 
sources to be reflected in asset prices.   
In strong-form efficiency, asset prices reflect all information – public and 
private.  This is an extreme form of market efficiency, because it implies that 
important company-specific information will be fully incorporated in asset prices 
with the very first trade after the information is generated and before it is publicly 
announced.  In strong-form efficient markets, most insider trading would be 
unprofitable.   
Fama (1991) renamed the market efficiency categories: tests for return 
predictability, event studies, and tests for private information instead of weak form, 
semi-strong form and strong form, respectively.  While the coverage of semi-strong 
and strong form efficiencies are the same as before, Fama added dividend yields and 
interest rates to the coverage of weak form efficiency. 
In this study, markets are accepted as semi-strong form efficient, and price 
adjustments to public information (the Kosovo Conflict) are investigated in an event 
study framework.   
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3.2 Event Studies 
 
 
Event studies measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm by 
using financial market data (MacKinlay 1997).  They are concerned with measuring 
abnormal returns around the date of an event that is specified.  The role of news as 
determinant of stock returns has been the subject of interest, because efficient market 
hypothesis assumes that stock returns fully reflect all available information and 
adjust immediately to the arrival of new information.  (Shapiro 1999)  Thus a 
measure of the event’s economic impact can be constructed using security prices 
observed over a relatively short time period. 
Event studies have emerged as the single most important tool of empirical 
finance research due to their ease of use, clarity of purpose, flexibility, and absence 
of confusing influences (Megginson 1997).  Event studies have a long history.  
According to MacKinlay, perhaps the first published study belongs to James Dolly 
(1933).  Over the decades from the early 1930s until the late of 1960s, the level of 
sophistication of event studies increased.   The improvements included removing 
general stock market price movements and separating out confounding events.  The 
methodology that is essentially the same as that which is in use today was introduced 
in late 1960s. 
Event studies have several major strengths.  First, a researcher is able to gain 
an unbiased assessment of stock prices reaction to a given event by averaging out 
random noise over many different observations.  Second, event studies are very clean 
tests that yield unambiguous results.  Third, event studies provide a direct test of 
semi-strong form market efficiency, since they allow one to determine if information 
is incorporated fully and instantaneously into stock prices.  (Megginson 1997)  
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The event study has many applications.  In accounting and finance research, 
event studies have been applied to a variety of firm specific and economy wide 
events.  Some examples include mergers and acquisitions, earning announcements, 
issues of debt or equity, regulatory changes and announcements of macroeconomic 
variables such as the trade deficit, and political events such as wars.  In majority of 
applications, the focus is the effect of an event on the price of a particular class of 
securities of the firm, most often common equity.  (MacKinlay 1997) 
Event studies can be used for different purposes: Market efficiency studies 
assess how quickly and correctly the market reacts to a particular type of 
information.  Information usefulness studies assess the degree to which company 
returns react to the release of a particular bit of news.  In a metric explanation study, 
the metrics are explained by splitting the sample into different subsamples and 
examining whether the unusual element of returns differed among the subsamples.  
The types of event studies can be classified as market efficiency, information value 
and metric explanation studies.   
Besides those three types, methodology studies of event study design can be 
accepted as a fourth type.  (Henderson 1990) The methodology studies consider how 
best to run event studies.  MacKinlay (1997) describes and discusses the procedures 
of standard event study methodology.  He defines models and brings up some 
problems shortly.  Henderson (1990) differs from MacKinlay in that he focuses in a 
detailed way on the problems and the approaches to deal with those problems in 
event studies.  Binder (1998) discusses the statistical power of the standard 
methodology in different applications and explicates the multivariate regression 
framework.  Collins and Dent (1984) make a comparison of alternative testing 
methodologies in event studies by means of simulation. 
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3.3 Studies Examining The Impacts Wars And Military Actions 
 
Previous studies examine a wide variety of news events and their effects on 
aggregate stock prices.  The discussion in this section is limited to studies dealing 
with the impacts of wars. 
McDonalds and Kendall (1994) examined the effects of political events in the 
stock market.  The stock price behavior of 16 U.S. defense industry firms was 
examined before and after 17 unforeseeable political events involving military 
forces.  Their findings reveal that stock prices for defense firms tend to rise as a 
result of military actions.  The events, as expected on the whole, appear not to have 
been anticipated.  The most important effect on the U.S. defense industry stocks was 
observed for those events involving the former Soviet Union.  Actions undertaken by 
the USSR were accompanied by dramatic increases in the U.S. defense industry 
stock prices. 
Attia (1998) investigated the impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the 
Persian Gulf War on the stock prices of petroleum companies operating in the Gulf 
countries.  His results provide evidence that the OPEC production had statistically 
significant influence on the average monthly index of multinational petroleum 
companies.  In addition, average stock prices of multinational petroleum companies 
are significantly higher during August 1990 (the month of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) 
than those during months before and after August.  However, he could not find a 
significant difference between the average stock prices during the overall war period 
and the average stock prices before and after the war period. 
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Shapiro (1999) used a portfolio approach to examine the response of defense 
shares to war –and peace – related news.  Consistent with other studies, the majority 
of the evidence confirms that the outbreaks of war, or announcements that increase 
the probability of a war commencing, are accompanied by positive abnormal returns.  
His study included a larger number of firms than those in previous studies.  He built 
defense portfolios according to companies’ R&D levels and found that the 
companies with high levels of R&D realized higher positive abnormal returns.  
Although he did not justify his results about R&D, it is supposed to be because 
R&D-oriented companies have more chance to introduce and promote new products 
when the market for defense products grows. 
Cantenar (2000), like Attia (1998), chose the intervention of the U.S. to the 
Gulf Crisis as the major event and investigated the impact of this event on U.S. 
defense stocks by using event study methodology.  His sample included thirty-nine 
defense firms selected from the U.S. Department of Defense top contractors list.  His 
analysis of the abnormal returns on defense stocks showed that the U.S. military 
intervention to the Gulf crisis affected those stocks significantly and positively in 
both short and long terms.  He extended his study to find if there was a difference in 
the reactions of firms according to companies’ defense dependency ratio (the ratio of 
military sales to total sales) and market value.  He found a positive relationship 
between defense dependency ratio and abnormal returns of defense firms, controlling 
for the size of the firm. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
 
 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 
 
The role of news (events) as a determinant of stock returns is our subject of 
interest because the efficient market hypothesis assumes that stock returns reflect all 
available information and adjust immediately to the arrival of new information.  The 
first hypothesis checks whether the returns of NATO member countries defense 
stocks react to the Kosovo War. 
The Kosovo War proved that there is a considerable difference between U.S. 
and European military capabilities due to supremacy of U.S. technology and 
application.  During the Kosovo War, superior U.S. products must have been used.  
Therefore, U.S. companies must have gotten the lion’s share from new orders.  It is 
expected that there would be a difference between the abnormal returns of U.S. and 
European companies.  Thus, it is hypothesized that there is no difference between 
abnormal returns of U.S. and European defense industry companies as the second 
hypothesis of the study. 
The Kosovo War took its place in history as the first battle executed and 
accomplished only by air forces.  Therefore, the air forces captured the biggest slice 
from the defense spendings during this war. It is expected that the aerospace 
companies react to this event differently than the non-aerospace companies.  So the 
last hypothesis is that there is no difference between the abnormal returns of 
aerospace companies and other defense companies. 
 17 
Table 4 depicts the summary of hypotheses that will be tested in this study. 
 
Table 4 
Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
 
• H10 : NATO countries defense industry stocks do not react to the Kosovo 
War 
H1A : NATO countries defense industry stocks react to the Kosovo War 
 
• H20 : Average reactions (abnormal returns) of U.S. defense companies are 
equal to the average reactions (abnormal returns) of European defense 
companies during the Kosovo War. 
H2A : Average reactions of U.S. defense companies are not equal to the 
average reactions of European defense companies during the Kosovo War. 
 
• H30 : Average reactions of aerospace companies are equal to the average 
reactions of non-aerospace companies during the Kosovo War. 
H3A : Average reactions of aerospace companies are not equal to the average 
reactions of non-aerospace companies during the Kosovo War. 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
 
In this section, standard event study methodology and its problems are 
reviewed first.  Then, due to the similarity of the Kosovo War to regulatory changes, 
the problems encountered in conducting event studies to examine regulatory changes 
are covered. Finally, two methods proposed to deal with these problems, namely 
Jaffe Standardized Residual Test and Multivariate Regression Model are discussed. 
4.2.1 Standard Event Study Methodology 
While there is no unique structure for conducting event studies, there is a 
general flow of analysis.  Henderson (1990) and MacKinlay (1997) define the event 
study steps similarly.  These steps are as follows:   
1. Defining the event date. 
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2. Measuring normal and abnormal returns. 
3. Statistically testing the abnormal returns. 
 
4.2.1.1 Defining the Event Date 
 
 
After defining the event, it must be determined when it took place.  This may 
seem simpler than it is.  The issue is not when an event occurred, but when the 
market, that is, its most interested and well informed segment, could have reasonably 
anticipated the news. 
The same holds for the Kosovo War.  There are eight incidents including 
meetings and negotiations until the last day of the Kosovo War.  Table 5 provides a 
list of events included in the analysis.  Selection of these dates is based on the belief 
that occurrences on these dates provided information concerning the probability that 
war would begin. In addition, the last day of the war is included to the analysis to see 
the effects of the end of the war. 
 
Table 5 
Chronology of Important Days for The Kosovo War 
 
Date   Event 
12 June 1998 
  
NATO Meeting At Defense Ministry Level First Time For  
Consideration Of Military Options To Kosovo 
13 October 1998   Authorization Of "Activation Orders" For Air Strikes 
30 January 1999   NATO And Contact Group Decision For Air strikes 
06-23 February 1999   1rst Round Of Paris Negotiations Between Albanians And Serbians 
15-18 March 1999   2nd Round Of Paris Negotiations Between Albanians And Serbians 
20 March 1999   US Ambassador Flew Belgrade To Warn For Air Strikes 
23 March 1999   Air Strikes Began  
10 June 1999   Air Strikes were Terminated  
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On 12 June 1998, the NATO Council, meeting at Defense Minister level, 
asked for an assessment of possible further measures that NATO might take for the 
Kosovo crisis.  This led to the consideration of a large number of possible military 
options.   On 13 October 1998, following a deterioration of the situation, NATO 
Council, authorized Activation Orders for air strikes.  This move was made to 
support diplomatic efforts, and it worked out.  The Serbian government agreed to 
comply and the air strikes were called off.  On 29 January 1999, Six Nation Contact 
Group agreed to convene urgent negotiations between parties to the conflict, under 
international mediation.  NATO supported Contact Group efforts by agreeing on 
January 30 to the use of air strikes if required, and by issuing a warning to both sides 
in the conflict.  As a result of NATO’s warnings, on dates 6-23 February and 15-18 
March 1999, Paris negotiations were organized.  As the final attempt, on 20 March 
1999, the U.S. Ambassador flew to Belgrade to warn for air strikes.  Serbia refused 
to comply and on 23 March 1999 air strikes began. On 10 June 1999, air strikes were 
terminated.  
 
4.2.1.2 Measuring Normal and Abnormal Returns 
  
In order to calculate normal and abnormal returns, event window and 
estimation window must be determined.  The estimation window is the period chosen 
to generate expected returns during the event window.  The event window is the 
period over which security prices of firms involved in this event will be examined.  
The event window is the event day plus and minus some number of days, weeks or 
months observed to see if anything unusual happened. 
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The event windows and estimation windows in previous studies differ from 
each other.  Cantenar (2000) defined his event window as 253 days, which included 
the event day and 252 days (one year) after the event.  He used an estimation window 
of 250 days, which ends 20 days before the event date.  Shapiro (1999) focused on a 
fairly short window: event day and next five trading days.  Shapiro used 180 trading 
days until 40 days before the headline date as his estimation window.  MacKinlay 
(1997) employed a 41-day event window, comprised of 20 pre-event days, the event 
day and 20 post-event days.  He used 250 trading days period prior to the event 
window as the estimation window.  Megginson (1997) proposed a very narrow event 
window to determine what the immediate reaction to the event is.  He suggested the 
period from 150 days to 20 days before the event day as the estimation window.  
McDonalds and Kendall (1994) defined their event window as 181 days around (90 
days before the event date, event day and 90 days after the event day) the event day.  
They used 200 days period before the event window as their estimation period.  It 
can be easily seen that there is not a precise consensus on the periods. 
In this study, there is not a single event and single event window.  There are 
multiple events and the event windows are three days – one day before the event, 
event day and one day after the event – for each event. In order to examine the short-
term effects of events, event windows are taken as three days. 
It is typical for the estimation window and the event window not to overlap.  
Estimation window must be before, after or both before and after some times the 
event window.  Including the event window in the estimation of the normal return 
parameters could lead to the event returns’ having a large influence on the normal 
return measure.  In this situation, both normal returns and abnormal returns would 
capture the event impact.  This would be problematic, since the methodology is built 
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on the assumption that the event impact is captured by the abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay 1997). 
Therefore, estimation window which is taken as 180 days, ends three days 
before, 12 June 1998, the first important event date for The Kosovo War, in order to 
prevent event and estimation windows to overlap. 
For the discussion of the methodology, some terms need to be defined.  
Normal return is defined as the return that would be expected if the event did not 
take place.  Abnormal return is the mathematical difference between observed return 
and normal (expected) return for that day, week or month.   
There are several approaches for describing a firm’s normal returns.  Some 
common ones are: mean returns, market adjusted returns and market returns.  In the 
mean returns approach, a company’s returns in the estimation period are averaged.  
In the event window, the company is expected to generate the average return as the 
normal return.  In the market adjusted returns model, a company, in the absence of 
news, is expected to generate the same returns as the market during event window.  
The method is used especially to examine the effects of initial public offerings since 
this it does not require an estimation window. The abnormal return for market 
adjusted model is calculated as follows: 
ARit = Rit – Rmt     (1) 
where Rit  and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
respectively. 
The market model that is used in this study is a statistical model, which 
relates the return of any given security to the return of the market portfolio.  This 
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method considers the risk of the security and the movement of the market during the 
event period.  For any security i the market model is: 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εi              (2)  
where Rit  and Rmt are the period-t returns on security i and the market portfolio, 
respectively.   αi and βi are the parameters of the market model and εi is the 
prediction error.  αi and βi parameter estimates are obtained from the regression 
model in equation (2) using estimation period data.  Given the market model 
estimates, the abnormal returns are found for the event period.  Using the market 
model to measure the normal return, the sample abnormal return is:  
ARit = Rit – αi – βi Rmt               (3) 
 
4.2.1.3 Statistical Tests of the Abnormal Returns 
 
Before testing, abnormal returns must be aggregated both across firms and 
across time.  Aggregation over time is a simple accumulation over the event window.  
In event studies, all time is kept relative to the event date.  The cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) is the sum of all the abnormal returns between the event date and day 
T.  CAR is computed for each firm as of time T as follows: 
∑
=
= T
t
itiT ARCAR
1
                     (4) 
Aggregation across firms involves the averaging of CARs for all firms in the 
sample on a given day in the event window.  The average cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR ) on a day T for N securities is defined as: 
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=
N
i
iTT CARNCAR 1
1             (5) 
where CARiT is the cumulative abnormal return for the ith security until day T 
starting from the event day. 
The last step in the event study is statistical testing of aggregated returns.  
Early event studies often used graphics as the primary method of interpretation.  
CAR plots were presented to show the reader how the firms reacted to an event.  
Such pictures are still routine in event studies.  But now, the results should be 
supported by statistical tests.   
To test the null hypothesis that the mean cumulative abnormal return is equal 
to zero for a sample of N firms, t statistic is employed as described in Barber and 
Lyon (1997): 
( )NCARTCARt TCAR σ=                 (6) 
where CAR T is the average cumulative abnormal return and σCAR  is the cross-
sectional sample standard deviation of cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of 
N firms.  When the sample is drawn randomly from a normal distribution, this test 
statistic follows a Student’s t-distribution under the null hypothesis.  The Central 
Limit Theorem guarantees that if the measures of abnormal returns in the cross-
section of firms are independent and identically distributed drawings from finite 
variance distributions, the distribution of the mean abnormal return measure 
converges to normal as the number of firms in the sample increases.  (Barber and 
Lyon 1997) 
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The method discussed to this point is parametric, in that specific assumptions 
have been made about the distribution of abnormal returns.  However, non-
parametric approaches, which are free of specific assumptions concerning the 
distribution of returns, are also available.   
Typically, non-parametric tests are not used in isolation but in conjunction 
with their parametric counterparts. The inclusion of the non-parametric tests provides 
a check of the robustness of conclusions based on parametric tests.   
In this study, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is used to examine the significance 
of cumulative abnormal returns.  This test is based on ranks.  The hypothesized 
median (zero in our case) is subtracted from each observation.  After subtraction, any 
result of zero is discarded.  And then the absolute values of remaining non-zero 
differences are ranked.  If two or more absolute differences are tied, the average rank 
is assigned to each.  The ranks corresponding to positive differences are summed to 
find the Wilcoxon statistic Rt.  Expected value and standard deviation for sum of 
ranks are defined as: 
 
( ) ( )
4
1+= NNRtE                         (7) 
( ) ( )( )
24
121 ++= NNNRtσ             (8) 
For N>12 the distribution of the following statistic can be adequately approximated 
by the standard normal: 
 
( )
( )R
RRZ
t
tt
t
E
σ
−=                          (9) 
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4.2.2 Event Study Problems  
 
In this section, event study problems will be discussed in two parts.  In the 
first part, standard event study methodology problems will be covered.  In the second 
part, the problems of regulatory event studies will be discussed due to the Kosovo 
War’s similarity to regulatory events. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Standard Event Study Problems 
 
After defining the event, a researcher must determine when it took place.  
Misidentification of an event date can obscure an issue.  Early merger studies used 
the date of a merger and found no significant evidence of shareholder return effects.  
Later studies, on the other hand, used the date on which the intent to merge was 
announced, and, they found significant abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. 
Having decided on the event date, the estimation period must be determined.  
There are three choices for the estimation period: before, after and around the event 
window.  The majority of studies used an estimation period before the event.  The 
problem with the estimation window is that it should not overlap event window to 
eradicate event’s effects on the normal return calculation. 
In addition to these procedural issues, there are some econometric problems.  
Regression models are based on a number of statistical assumptions.  Specifically, 
the models assume that the residuals: are normally distributed with a mean of zero, 
are not serially correlated, have a constant variance, and are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables.  Further, when regression system is used, it is also assumed 
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that there is no correlation between residuals for the different firms.  However, there 
is reason to be concerned about each of these assumptions. 
Non-normality: the non-normality problem is potentially more troublesome 
for studies using daily data, because daily returns are non-normal.  Fortunately, the 
same is not true for residuals, since the distribution of residuals should be close 
enough to normal. 
Autocorrelation and Non-synchronous trading: there may be statistically 
significant autocorrelation in the residuals.8 Non-synchronous trading – the 
mismatching of the values for Rmt and Rit owing to trading frequencies – creates bias 
in betas of individual securities.  The result is that the betas of infrequently traded 
securities are downward biased, while shares trading with more than average 
frequency have upward biased betas.  (Henderson 1990) Unfortunately, the extra 
work for autocorrelation and non-synchronous trading does not seem to strengthen 
event study results. 
Variance shifts: when the method of cumulating abnormal returns across 
firms and then aggregating in time is used, it is assumed that the variance does not 
change during the event window. When there are variance shifts, this assumption 
does not hold. In order to solve problems about variance shifts, the use cross-
sectional variance is suggested, but there are costs to using such cross-sectional 
measures.  Such a calculation implicitly assumes that the variance for every firm is 
the same on day t and the estimates ignore estimation period data. 
Event (calendar) clustering and correlation between residuals: calendar 
clustering refers to events occurring at or near the same time.  Industry clustering 
refers to events concentrated in the same industry.  Both event and industry 
                                                 
8 The autocorrelation of residuals are found insignificant in this study. 
 27 
clusterings cause to reject the hypotheses more often in standard event study 
methodology by leading to correlation between residuals.   
This problem will be discussed in a more detailed way in the next section. 
 
4.2.2.2 Problems of Regulatory Event Studies 
 
Three features of regulatory events make them more difficult to analyze than 
other types of events. (Binder 1985b) First, for many important regulations it is not 
accurately known when expectations change.  Unlike stock splits or similar simple 
events, regulatory events usually involve no single well-defined announcement; 
rather there are multiple announcements, such as committee or senate approval 
during the legislative or administrative process.  Regulatory announcements are also 
more likely to be anticipated than are corporate announcements.  Because of the size 
of potential wealth transfers, there are extensive negotiations between interest groups 
and politicians of regulation before the actual voting; therefore the outcome is likely 
to be known ahead of time.   
Second, it is not clear a priori that the effects of regulation are consistently 
positive or negative: in the same industry some firms may gain while others lose.  
Protective regulation can take a variety of forms and choice of form may affect 
differently the welfare of industry members.  When there is this asymmetry, the usual 
tests of the significance of average or cumulative average returns will often falsely 
reject the hypothesis that regulation has an effect. 
Finally, unlike other events that are most often studied, regulation often 
affects firms in the same industry during the same calendar time periods.  Therefore, 
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when significant excess returns are found, it is not certain that whether these are due 
to regulation or to some other industry-specific shock. 
These characteristics are valid for the Kosovo War as well.  There are many 
negotiations and meetings that possibly changed the expectations and anticipations 
before the beginning of the war9.  It is expected that firms react differently to the 
war.  All firms are in the defense industry and the event date is same for all firms.   
The event clustering and industry clustering lead to cross-sectional 
correlations of the dependent variable of interest (Collins and Dent 1984).  Testing 
procedures, which fail to take cross-sectional correlations into account, can lead to 
unwarranted inferences. In order to provide some insights into the potential severity 
of the cross-sectional correlation problem, Collins and Dent (1984) computed the 
degree of bias for different sample sizes and levels of correlations. Table 6, taken 
from this study, illustrates that both sample size and the level of cross-correlation 
affect the degree of bias in the standard deviations of the sampling distribution of 
average portfolio abnormal returns. 
Table 7 shows the distribution of correlations between abnormal returns of 
securities in this study.  This information can be used for estimating the degree of 
bias.  The mean level of cross-correlations is 0.057 and the sample size is 56 
securities, estimation procedures yield estimates of σx (average standard deviation of 
abnormal returns of sample securities), which are approximately 60% of the true or 
correct value10.  The statistical tests of standard event study methodology based on σx 
can lead to biased test results due to understating the standard deviation.  Therefore, 
Jaffe Standardized Residual Test (JSR) and Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) 
will be employed to deal with the cross-correlation problem. 
                                                 
9 Table 5 shows the important dates for the Kosovo War. 
10 60% is calculated via interpolation by using Table 7.  
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Table 6 
Ratio of σX (Independence) / σX (Dependence) for Various Levels of Cross-
Correlation and Sample Sizes 
        
 Sample Size 
Level of  
Correlation 
5 10 20 40 60 80 100 
0.00 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.10 0.8452 0.7255 0.5872 0.4518 0.3807 0.3352 0.3029 
0.20 0.7454 0.5976 0.4564 0.3371 0.2795 0.2440 0.2193 
0.30 0.6742 0.5199 0.3863 0.2806 0.2312 0.2012 0.1805 
0.40 0.6202 0.4663 0.3410 0.2454 0.2016 0.1751 0.1569 
0.50 0.5774 0.4264 0.3086 0.2209 0.1811 0.1571 0.1407 
0.60 0.5423 0.3953 0.2840 0.2024 0.1657 0.1437 0.1287 
0.70 0.5130 0.3701 0.2644 0.1880 0.1538 0.1333 0.1193 
0.80 0.4879 0.3492 0.2485 0.1762 0.1440 0.1248 0.1117 
0.90 0.4663 0.3315 0.2351 0.1664 0.1360 0.1178 0.1054 
σX (Independence)= (1/ N) σ2 
σX (Dependence)= (1/ N) σ2 + ((N-1) / N) σi j 
where: 
N = number of securities in sample 
σ 2 = average variance of abnormal returns of sample securities 
σi j = average covariance of abnormal returns of sample securities equal to ρ σi σj 
 σX (Independence) /  σX (Dependence) = 1/ √1+(N-1) ρ 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Distribution of Pairwise Correlations Between Abnormal Returns of 
Sample Securities 
 
Mean   Median   StDev     
t-
statistic      
0.0566  0.045  0.1026   4.12    
  Deciles   
Min. 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Max. 
-0.211 -0.058 -0.025 0.001 0.023 0.045 0.065 0.092 0.132 0.190 0.969 
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4.2.3 Jaffe Standardized Residual (JSR) Test 
 
This testing methodology uses a portfolio approach in the estimation of 
abnormal returns. In order not to be influenced by the correlations between abnormal 
returns of securities, the residual variance of an equally weighted portfolio of 
securities is measured.  The residual variance of  this portfolio is measured over an 
estimation period and it is used in testing the significance of the abnormal returns in 
the event window as follows: for each point, t, in the estimation period the abnormal 
returns from equation (3) are aggregated across the N securities to form average 
abnormal return (AAR) of portfolio in period t: 
∑
=
= N
i
itt ARAAR N 1
1         for t = 1,…, T           (10) 
The variance of the average abnormal returns is then computed as:  
∑ −
=−=
T
t
AARAARtT
AAR
1
2
)(1
1)var(            (11) 
where 
    ∑
=
= T
t
tAART
AAR
1
1              (12) 
and (1,T) is 180-day estimation period. 
For the case where all securities in the sample experience the critical event at 
the same point in calendar time, the JSR test is: 
S
AAR
AAR
t        ~ tN-1                             (13) 
where  ( )AARS AAR var= . 
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4.2.4 Multivariate Regression Model 
Rather than modeling abnormal returns as prediction errors from the market 
model equation, the sample period can be extended to contain the event period and 
(when there is only one event) a zero-one variable Dt can be included in the return 
equation: 
Rit = αi + βi Rmt  + γi Dt + uit           (14) 
The coefficient γi is the abnormal return for security i during period t and is directly 
estimated in the regression.  That is, this approach parameterizes the abnormal return 
in the market model regression equation.  This model can be adapted to equally 
weighted portfolio of firms, all of which experienced the events during the same 
calendar periods: 
Rpt =  αp + βp Rmt  + γp Dt + upt           (15) 
When an equally weighted portfolio is used as the dependent variable, γp gives the 
estimate of the average abnormal return across the stocks in the portfolio. 
Alternatively, when there are multiple events, different dummy variables can be used 
for each event. 
Tests of the hypothesis that the event affected security prices, based on the 
estimated gammas in equation (15), will not be very powerful when abnormal returns 
differ in sign across the sample firms.  This asymmetry can be modeled by 
disaggregating equation (15) into a multivariate regression model (MVRM) system 
of equations with one equation for each of the N firms experiencing the A events: 
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This methodology, which allows the coefficients to differ across firms, 
appears to have been first implemented by Binder (1985a) and Schipper and 
Thompson (1983). 
The system of equations can be written in the form: 
ε+Γ= XR       (17) 
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(18) 
where Ri = T X 1 (570 days X 1) vector, 
Xi = K X T (12 parameters X 570 days) matrix of independent variables, 
Γ = a K N X 1 (672 X 1) vector of coefficients, 
εi = a T X 1 vector of disturbances. 
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The efficient estimator is generalized least squares.  The model has a 
particularly convenient form.  For the tth observation, N X N covariance matrix of 
disturbances is: 
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 (19) 
so in equation (17), 
IV ⊗Σ=         (20) 
where ⊗  denotes the Kronecker product 
and       IV ⊗= Σ−− 11          (21) 
GLS estimator is found as follows: 
β∧  = [X’ V-1 X]-1 X’ V-1 Ri      (22) 
The preceding discussion assumes that Σ is known, which is rarely the case.  
However, feasible generalized least squares have been devised (Greene 1990).  The 
least squares residuals are used to estimate consistently the elements of Σ with: 
T
ee ji
ijij s
'
==∧σ               (23) 
and the estimate of Σ is: 
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When Σ is unknown, S is used in the generalized least squares estimation.   
A standard assumption in the system of equations (16) is that the disturbances 
are independent and identically distributed within each equation, but their variances 
differ across equations.  It is also assumed that across equations the contemporaneous 
covariances of the disturbances are nonzero, but that noncontemporaneous 
covariances all equal zero.  These assumptions, which evidence indicates fit stock 
return data fairly well, place a particular structure on the variance-covariance matrix 
Σ of the disturbances in the stacked generalized least squares regression used to 
estimate the parameters of the system. 
The MVRM is obviously different from ordinary least squares. In MVRM, 
the equations are linked by their disturbances. If the equations are actually unrelated, 
there is no efficiency gain from using the MVRM.  The greater the correlation of 
disturbances, the greater the efficiency gain accruing to MVRM. In the more general 
case, with unrestricted correlation of the disturbances and different regressors in 
equations, the results are complicated and depend on data. (Greene 1990) However, 
tests of hypotheses in this framework explicitly control for the contemporaneous 
correlation and heteroskedasticity problems discussed in Section 4.2.2.2 above by 
employing the estimate of Σ. Thus, a number of statistical problems that are of 
concern in the standard event study methodology are solved directly in the regression 
framework as long as the disturbances in each equation have the assumptions 
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mentioned above.  Moreover, the real advantage of the MVRM framework over the 
standard methodology lies in its ability to allow the abnormal returns to differ across 
firms and to easily test joint hypotheses about the abnormal returns.  Table 8 shows 
some examples of joint hypotheses. 
 
Table 8 
Hypotheses Testing in the MVRM 
  
Hypothesis    Description 
 
H1: 1/N Σi γia= 0 The average abnormal return during announcement period a 
equals zero  
 
H2:  γia= 0 ∀ i,  All abnormal returns for announcement period a equal zero  
 
 
 
While a number of different hypotheses about abnormal returns can be tested, 
the two hypotheses in Table 8 seem to be of primary interest in this literature (Binder 
1985a).  The test of H1 is similar to standard event study methodology hypothesis.   
H2  is joint hypothesis that the abnormal returns equal zero for all firms a given 
announcement. 
Test of H2 will be more powerful tests of whether an event affects the sample 
firms than tests of H1 when the abnormal returns differ in sign (Binder 1985b).  The 
joint hypothesis is the benefit of MVRM especially when some firms lose while 
others gain. 
Like Schipper and Thompson (1983), the Wald test, which is asymptotically 
distributed as chi-squared due to the use of a consistent estimate of covariance 
matrix, is used in testing the linear restrictions.  Binder (1985a, b) warns that  
asymptotic statistics are biased in tests with as many as 60 monthly returns or 250 
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daily returns.  In this study, to deal with this problem, 570 daily returns are used in 
estimation.  
 
4.3 Data 
The sample in this study is limited to the defense companies of NATO 
member countries, which have a so called defense sector on their stock markets. This 
is the case for only three markets: New York, London and Paris. The use of this 
constraint resulted in a sample of 57 companies. One French and three U.S. firms are 
removed from the sample due to problems like missing or unreliable data. In addition 
to these companies, 3 Turkish companies are added to the sample.  Although there 
are more than 30 companies in the contractors list of Turkish Defense Ministry, only 
three of them are traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The overall sample 
contains 56 companies. 
Daily prices of 56 securities and indices of four markets between 10 February 
1998 and 18 April 2000 (totaling 570 trading days) are obtained from DataStream.  
DataStream adjusts prices for dividend payments and stock splits.  Market indices 
used in the analysis are DataStream equal-weighted market indices. Also financial 
statements of the sample companies are obtained from DataStream. 
Table 9 displays some characteristics of the sample.  First column shows 
from which country the companies are.  Second column depicts the companies’ lines 
of business.  Third and fourth columns show the market values and sales as of 
December 1999, respectively. 
There are 34 U.S., 12 U.K., 7 French and 3 Turkish companies in the sample.  
Main lines of business for these defense companies are aerospace and electronics 
 37 
sectors including 18 and 20 companies, respectively.  Weapon, automotive and 
chemicals sectors have 7, 11, and 6 companies, respectively.   
Mean market value of U.S. companies is 11.65 billion dollars, while it is 2.26 
billion dollars for European companies.  When the sales of U.S. and European 
companies are compared, it can be seen that mean sales are 9.51 billion dollars for 
U.S. companies and 1.42 billion dollars for European companies.   
Compared to others, the aerospace sector has the highest mean market value 
of 14.7 billion dollars.  The mean market value of non-aerospace companies is 5.24 
billion dollars.  Sales figures display a similar pattern.  Aerospace sector mean sales 
is 12.05 billion dollars, while mean sales of non-aerospace companies is 4.01 billion 
dollars.    
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Table 9 
Sample Companies List 
Name Country LOB Market Value Sales 
Aim Group UK A 59 109 
Alliant Techsystems US B, D 1,143 1,090 
Alvis UK D 250 377 
Amer.Pacific US E 93 73 
Arvin Inds. US D 2 3,101 
Aselsan TR B 478 144 
Bae Systems UK A, B, C 21,046 11,359 
Boeing US A, B, C 42,003 57,993 
Chemring UK B, E 100 106 
Cmp.Sciences US B 8,934 7,660 
Cnim (Ca) FR C 11 61 
Cobham UK C 1,336 702 
Dassault Aviation FR A 167 445 
Eaton US E 5,180 8,402 
Fmc US D 2,983 4,111 
Gen.Dynamics US A 11,434 8,959 
Gen.Elec. US A, B, E 618,677 111,108 
Gencorp US A, D, E 593 1,071 
Gfi Industries FR D 42 71 
Gkn UK A, D 11,696 5,980 
Gte  US B 91,835 25,336 
Hampson Inds. UK A 142 231 
Harris US B 3,843 1,744 
Harsco US F 1,223 1,717 
Health Net US F 756 855 
Hercules US E 6,348 3,248 
Honeywell Intl. US A, C 48,604 23,735 
Intl.Shiphldg. US F 471 326 
Johnson Controls US F 7,277 16,139 
Kaman 'A' US F 246 982 
Latecoere FR A 22 29 
Lockheed Martin Corp. US A, B 20,160 25,530 
Ltv US F 1,592 4,120 
Martin Mrta.Mats. US F 2,553 1,259 
Meggitt UK A, B 1,210 559 
Netas Telekomunik TR B 848 168 
Northrop Grumman Corp. US B 5,840 8,995 
Oshkosh Truck 'B' US D 501 1,165 
Otokar TR D 192 88 
Raytheon US A, B 21,081 19,530 
Rockwell Automation US B 10,788 7,043 
Rolls-Royce UK D 6,337 7,651 
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Name Country LOB Market Value Sales 
Sagem FR B, C 841 525 
Sequa 'A' US F 904 1,700 
Smiths Group UK A, B, F 4,219 2,135 
Technofan FR A 5 5 
Tenneco Autv. US C 1,867 3,279 
Texas Insts. US B, F 7,663 9,468 
Textron US A, D 18,040 11,579 
Trw US B 14,659 19,969 
Ultra Electronics Hdg. UK B 444 311 
Umeco UK F 79 86 
Unisys US B 10,434 7,545 
United Technologies US A 34,931 24,127 
Wash.Gp.Intl. US E, F 506 2,248 
Zodiac FR C 197 129 
Notes:  
1.  Countries are US: United States of America, UK: United Kingdom, FR: France and TR: Turkey 
2.  Values are as of 12.31.1999, Million US Dollars 
3.  LOB: Line of Business 
A: Aerospace B: Electronics and Communication    C: Weapon and Military Equipment  
D: Automotive and Military Vehicle     E: Chemicals   F: Other: Building, Health, Transportation etc.   
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
 
This chapter discusses the results of testing the hypotheses mentioned in the 
previous chapter.  Initially, the market model is used in the estimation of abnormal 
returns. For 46 out of 56 stocks in the sample, the coefficient estimates were 
insignificant. That being the case, the market adjusted model is used in conducting 
the standard event study methodology.  
 
5.1 Graphical Results 
 
Before analyzing the statistical tests, Figure 1 presents CARs for the overall 
sample in order to give some feeling about the data. 
Figure 1 shows the CARs beginning from 20 days before the first event in 
Table 5 (12 June 1998, the first international meeting on the Kosovo conflict), which 
is taken as day 0.  In Figure 1, it can be seen that there is a downward trend in the 
CARs of defense stocks. After the end of Cold War, stocks of defense companies 
have not soared for more than a decade.14 There were a clearly defined enemy and 
high spending on defense fuelled by the Cold War on those days. Now the U.S. and 
European armies have fewer personnel and defense budgets have shrunk by 100 
billion dollars. As a result of this, the downward trend has been observed since the 
end of the Cold War.11 
 
                                                 
 
11Source:  Economist, 7/20/2002, Vol. 364 Issue 8282, p3 
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Figure 1 
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In Figure 1, there are apparent abnormal returns around days 57 and 219. On 
the 57th day, 30 August 1998, the U.S. market index decreased dramatically. By the 
effect of this decrease, European market indices decreased on 01 September 1998. 
Although market indices decreased dramatically, defense stock prices did not move 
with the markets. Since the abnormal return is the difference between the real return 
and the market return, there occurred high levels of abnormal returns for that time 
period. 
On 219th day, 13 April 1999, the Serbian Army attacked Albania. Until that 
day, the expectation was that Serbian forces would not resist to NATO attacks. But 
after that day, it was understood that the war would last longer than expected. So the 
defense stocks reacted positively to this event. 
Two events identified with the help of Figure 1 are added to the event list. 
Table 10 presents the extended list of events used in the rest of the analysis. 
Table 10 
Chronology of Important Days for The Kosovo War 
 
Event Exp.Reaction Date Definition 
1 + 12.06.1998 First international meeting on the Kosovo Conflict considering military solutions 
2 +/- 30.08.1998 Dramatic decrease in market indices 
3 + 13.10.1998 Authorization Of "Activation Orders" For Air Strikes 
4 +/- 30.01.1999 NATO And Contact Group Decision For Air strikes 
5 +/- 23.02.1999 1rst Round Of Paris Negotiations Between Albanians And Serbians 
6 + 18.03.1999 2nd Round Of Paris Negotiations Between Albanians And Serbians 
7 +/- 20.03.1999 US Ambassador Flew Belgrade To Warn For Air Strikes 
8 + 23.03.1999 Air Strikes Began  
9 + 13.04.1999 Serbia Attacks to Albania 
10 - 10.06.1999 End of Air Strikes  
 
The first column of the Table 10 shows the expected reactions to these 
events. After the events 4 and 7, the change in the probability of the war depends on 
the response of the sides. For event 5, it is not known what the exact result of the 
meeting is. So, in these cases the sign of the reactions is ambiguous. 
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The effects of the events listed on Table 10 are investigated for all firms and 
for four portfolios. The companies are grouped according to their countries of origin 
and sectors. The first two portfolios are the U.S.-companies portfolio and the 
European-firms portfolio. The U.S.-companies portfolio consists of 9 aerospace, 8 
electronics, 5 automotive, 5 weapon producer companies and 7 companies from other 
sectors, totaling 34 companies. Mean market value and sales for this portfolio are 
11.65 and 9.51 billion dollars, respectively.  The European-firms portfolio includes 9 
aerospace 4 electronics, 4 automotive, 3 weapon producer companies and 2 
companies from other sectors, totaling 22 firms. Mean market value and sales for the 
European-firms portfolio are 2.26 and 1.42 billion dollars, respectively. 
The remaining two portfolios are the aerospace-firms portfolio and the 
portfolio of the firms in non-aerospace sectors. There are 9 U.S. companies and 9 
European companies in the aerospace-companies portfolio. The mean market value 
and sales for aerospace firms are 14.7 and 12.05 billion dollars, respectively. The 
non-aerospace-firms portfolio consists of 25 U.S. firms and 13 European firms. 
Mean market value is 5.24 billion dollars and mean sales are 4.01 billion dollars for 
the other firms portfolio. 
 
5.2 Statistical Tests Results 
 
In this section, statistical test results of the hypotheses mentioned in Chapter 
4 will be presented.  
5.2.1 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Table 11 shows the results for the tests of the first hypothesis that the Kosovo 
War had no impact on defense stocks. The first two columns show the results of the 
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standard event study methodology. The second two columns show the results of non-
parametric Wilcoxon test. The third two columns presents the results of JSR test. The 
fourth two columns depict the test of MVRM for average effects. The last two 
columns show that the test of MVRM for individual effects.  
Table 11 shows that almost all events are significant according to t-test 
results. Besides, some results are contradicting to expectations about the reactions of 
the defense firms to the events. For example, event three is the authorization of 
Activation Orders for air strikes on 13 October 1998, and this event must have 
increased expectations of a war and affected the defense firms positively. However, 
the CARs obtained by the standard event study methodology, have negative sign. 
WSR results are similar to t-test results.  This is not surprising given that the 
test statistics assume independence of observations. So WSR test should be suffering 
from the same problem as the t-test, and therefore are not that reliable. The rest of the 
analysis will continue with only JSR, average and individual reaction tests of 
MVRM. 
Table 11 
Tests of H10 that the Kosovo War Had No Impact on the Defense Stocks 
 
  t-Test WSR JSR 
MVRM Avg. 
Reaction 
MVRM Ind. 
Reaction 
EVENT CAR T Wil. St. P Val.  CAR t Wald P Val. Wald P Val. 
1 -0.0046  -1.98** 562 0.06      -0.0046   -0.43 6.21 0.00 52.32 0.62 
2 0.0168   6.70*** 1432 0.00 0.0168    2.29** 0 0.99 91.07 0.00 
3 -0.0115  -2.81*** 398 0.00 -0.0115   -0.13 2.67 0.10 72.08 0.08 
4 -0.0049  -1.43 558.5 0.05 -0.0049    0.93 1.15 0.18 125.74 0.00 
5 -0.0074  -2.63** 458 0.01 -0.0074   -0.48 0.26 0.61 68.02 0.13 
6 -0.0045  -1.97* 543 0.04 -0.0045   -0.13 0.07 0.80 61.67 0.28 
7 -0.0111  -5.01*** 254.5 0.00 -0.0111   -0.29 0.38 0.54 74.42 0.05 
8 0.0025   1.13 924 0.31 0.0025   -0.46 0.56 0.46 70.09 0.10 
9 0.0368   9.38*** 1541.5 0.00 0.0368    2.94** 27.4 0.00 139.66 0.00 
10 0.0038   1.71* 1061 0.03 0.0038    0.54 0.11 0.74 63.14 0.24 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level        
**   Significant at the 5 percent level        
*     Significant at the 10 percent level        
Note: CARs are computed over the time period between one day before and after the event days.   
Wald test is distributed as chi-square with 1 and 56 degrees of freedom, respectively. 
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The third two columns in Table 11, which present the JSR test results show 
that CARs for the all-firms portfolio are significant at the 0.05 level only for events 2 
and 9. According to the fourth two columns, the average reactions in MVRM are 
significant at the 0.01 level for events 1 and 9. In the fifth two columns of Table 11, 
there are significant abnormal returns for events 2, 4 and 9. For these three events, 
the individual reactions in MVRM are significant at the 0.01 level.  
While JSR test and the first test of MVRM check results for the average 
reactions to the events, the second test of MVRM checks individual reactions to 
them. Table 12 shows the individual parameter estimates for each firm. % negative 
shows the portion of negative parameter coefficients for each event. % negative 
measure is useful for the interpretation of MVRM tests. Because, the individual 
reaction test of MVRM is more likely to detect the effects of an event when some 
firms gain and others lose than is the test of average effects, the reverse is true when 
the abnormal returns for all firms have same sign. 
Table 12 shows that 77% of parameter coefficients are negative for event 1 
and 86% of parameter coefficients are positive for event 9. Since the most of the 
parameter estimates have the same sign, first test of MVRM that deals with average 
effects detect abnormal returns easily for events 1 and 9. For events 2 and 4, the 
numbers of positive and negative coefficients are almost equal. In this situation, 
second test of MVRM detects the reactions for events 2 and 4. So, having 
complementary two tests is the main advantage of MVRM while other methods 
focus on average effects. 
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Table 12 
Individual Parameter Estimates of MVRM 
COMPANY α β γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10   
Alliantt  0.0000 -0.0678 0.0011 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0022 0.0004 -0.0074 0.0071 -0.0037  
Amerpaci  0.0001 0.0832 -0.0034 0.0038 -0.0158 0.0021 0.0017 0.0102 0.0008 -0.0063 -0.0032 0.0002  
Gencorp  -0.0002 0.0249 -0.0072 -0.0076 0.0057 -0.0064 -0.0012 -0.0036 0.0031 -0.0090 0.0196 -0.0005  
Gendynam 0.0002 -0.1584 -0.0030 -0.0020 0.0033 0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0017 -0.0048 0.0046 0.0044 -0.0065  
Martinmr  0.0001 0.0042 -0.0077 0.0095 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0027 0.0043 -0.0125 0.0042 0.0077 -0.0045  
Oshkosht  0.0009 0.1183 -0.0106 -0.0002 -0.0092 0.0002 -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0017 0.0025 0.0032  
Northrop  -0.0006 -0.0576 -0.0065 -0.0017 0.0029 0.0169 0.0038 0.0008 -0.0096 0.0010 0.0144 -0.0066  
Intlship  -0.0005 0.0932 -0.0015 -0.0044 0.0005 0.0002 0.0035 -0.0043 0.0104 -0.0147 0.0045 -0.0071  
Raytheon  -0.0008 -0.0588 -0.0056 -0.0139 0.0016 -0.0023 0.0005 0.0028 0.0024 0.0020 0.0137 0.0032  
Healthne  -0.0009 -0.2032 -0.0027 0.0115 -0.0143 -0.0044 -0.0026 0.0107 -0.0173 0.0205 0.0119 -0.0023  
Lockheed  -0.0008 -0.0468 -0.0003 0.0092 -0.0005 0.0085 0.0082 -0.0008 -0.0051 -0.0031 0.0186 -0.0243  
Ltv  -0.0008 0.0241 -0.0108 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0088 -0.0233 0.0011 -0.0066 0.0054 0.0199 -0.0033  
Kamana  -0.0005 0.0285 0.0074 0.0079 -0.0083 0.0035 -0.0022 0.0086 -0.0097 -0.0089 0.0193 0.0021  
Cmpscien  0.0004 0.0320 0.0029 0.0179 0.0065 -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0102 -0.0112 0.0026 -0.0048 -0.0076  
Washgpin  -0.0003 -0.0441 -0.0021 0.0016 0.0066 0.0081 0.0004 -0.0038 -0.0020 -0.0034 0.0128 0.0001  
Rockwell  -0.0002 -0.1620 -0.0091 0.0068 0.0046 0.0076 0.0040 -0.0018 -0.0064 -0.0060 0.0120 0.0021  
Fmc  -0.0001 -0.0769 -0.0082 0.0025 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0057 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0194 0.0007  
Tennecoa  -0.0008 -0.0167 -0.0057 0.0068 -0.0041 -0.0032 0.0154 -0.0007 -0.0119 0.0116 0.0063 -0.0022  
Hercules  -0.0011 -0.1662 -0.0044 0.0121 0.0012 0.0097 0.0018 -0.0003 -0.0025 -0.0027 0.0331 0.0023  
Textron  -0.0002 -0.0115 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0078 0.0019 0.0010 -0.0041 0.0045 -0.0063 0.0163 -0.0086  
Unisys  0.0000 0.1356 0.0049 0.0147 0.0146 -0.0049 -0.0014 0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0034 0.0067 -0.0014  
Unitedte  0.0003 -0.0537 -0.0025 0.0052 0.0018 0.0052 -0.0016 0.0050 0.0015 -0.0086 0.0101 -0.0128  
Trw  0.0000 -0.1589 -0.0046 0.0061 0.0043 -0.0076 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0060 -0.0076 0.0009 0.0029  
Texasins  0.0013 0.0105 -0.0142 0.0082 0.0021 0.0004 0.0120 0.0028 -0.0276 0.0084 0.0038 0.0114  
Harsco  -0.0005 -0.0840 0.0007 0.0012 0.0037 0.0099 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0028 0.0004 0.0251 0.0007  
Genelec  0.0006 -0.0895 -0.0032 -0.0052 0.0098 -0.0024 0.0007 0.0025 -0.0011 -0.0074 -0.0082 -0.0024  
Sequaa  -0.0002 0.0554 -0.0027 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0086 -0.0046 0.0027 0.0126 -0.0046  
Boeing  -0.0003 -0.0486 -0.0061 0.0161 0.0072 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.0076 -0.0040 0.0040 0.0197 -0.0038  
Arvinind  -0.0005 0.0710 -0.0065 0.0058 0.0150 -0.0044 -0.0015 -0.0033 -0.0011 -0.0051 0.0168 0.0003  
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Company α β γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9 γ10   
Gtedeadm  0.0003 -0.1880 -0.0038 -0.0053 0.0057 -0.0012 0.0031 0.0004 -0.0199 0.0138 0.0035 -0.0022  
Harris  -0.0005 0.0191 -0.0068 0.0078 0.0061 0.0079 -0.0113 0.0052 0.0027 -0.0058 0.0367 0.0010  
Honeyw  0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0069 -0.0059 0.0015 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0025 0.0038 0.0089 -0.0024  
Johnsonc  0.0000 -0.0851 -0.0063 0.0012 0.0143 -0.0035 0.0058 0.0065 -0.0048 -0.0034 0.0087 0.0010  
Eaton  -0.0001 -0.1545 -0.0099 0.0016 0.0054 -0.0106 -0.0002 0.0025 -0.0026 0.0004 0.0167 -0.0041  
Gkn  0.0001 0.1313 -0.0135 -0.0009 0.0089 0.0143 -0.0041 -0.0048 0.0072 -0.0111 0.0124 0.0041  
Baesyste  -0.0004 -0.0614 -0.0113 0.0000 0.0265 0.0052 0.0139 0.0011 -0.0079 0.0103 0.0068 0.0022  
Aimgroup  -0.0008 0.1987 -0.0029 -0.0115 0.0417 0.0143 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0049 -0.0114 0.0005 0.0008  
Alvis  -0.0004 0.3111 0.0004 0.0027 -0.0038 -0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0018 0.0084 -0.0023 0.0121 -0.0026  
Chemring  0.0002 0.1466 0.0083 -0.0071 -0.0014 0.0213 -0.0040 -0.0007 0.0022 0.0051 -0.0023 -0.0008  
Cobham  0.0001 0.0551 -0.0078 -0.0120 0.0028 0.0171 -0.0077 0.0136 -0.0116 0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0012  
Hampsoni  -0.0004 0.1615 0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0009 0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0072 0.0099 -0.0060 0.0002 0.0004  
Meggitt  -0.0003 0.3388 -0.0121 0.0010 0.0034 0.0175 0.0040 -0.0082 0.0094 -0.0086 0.0121 0.0119  
Rollsroy  -0.0001 0.0558 -0.0117 -0.0057 0.0139 0.0227 0.0106 -0.0094 0.0144 -0.0150 0.0114 0.0013  
Smithsgr  -0.0001 -0.1459 -0.0148 0.0037 0.0171 0.0175 0.0032 -0.0259 0.0055 -0.0109 0.0105 -0.0016  
Ultraele  0.0001 0.1460 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0080 -0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0005  
Umeco  0.0004 0.1491 -0.0049 -0.0146 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0038 -0.0048 0.0141 -0.0194 0.0083 -0.0021  
Cnimca  0.0005 0.1386 0.0031 -0.0071 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0063 0.0002 0.0025 -0.0012  
Sagem  0.0013 0.3407 0.0030 -0.0011 0.0005 0.0051 0.0004 -0.0071 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0004 -0.0012  
Dassault  0.0002 0.2731 0.0030 -0.0042 0.0203 0.0021 0.0098 -0.0055 -0.0103 -0.0052 -0.0019 0.0044  
Gfiindus  -0.0003 0.4319 -0.0083 -0.0124 -0.0053 -0.0130 -0.0037 -0.0028 0.0021 -0.0024 0.0074 -0.0056  
Latecoer  -0.0003 0.1644 0.0012 -0.0093 0.0086 -0.0171 0.0091 -0.0035 0.0096 -0.0071 0.0118 0.0062  
Technofa  0.0003 0.0913 -0.0101 -0.0058 -0.0014 0.0066 0.0018 0.0027 0.0048 -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0077  
Zodiac  -0.0001 0.3101 -0.0054 -0.0055 -0.0082 -0.0038 0.0022 -0.0007 -0.0049 -0.0014 0.0136 0.0078  
Aselsan  0.0021 0.0408 -0.0075 -0.0021 -0.0051 -0.0046 0.0051 0.0188 -0.0141 0.0054 0.0236 0.0158  
Netastel  0.0015 0.0289 -0.0215 -0.0175 -0.0153 -0.0031 0.0054 0.0082 -0.0061 -0.0032 0.0211 0.0041  
Otokar  0.0013 -0.0046 -0.0154 0.0038 0.0009 0.0023 0.0169 -0.0025 0.0213 -0.0043 0.0243 0.0090  
               
Average   0.0000 0.0369 -0.0049 0.0000 0.0032 0.0021 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0018 -0.0021 0.0102 -0.0006   
% Negative 55% 43% 77% 54% 34% 48% 48% 59% 79% 64% 14% 57%   
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To sum up the results for the all-firms portfolio, according to Table 11, there 
are significant negative reaction to event 1 and significant positive reaction to event 9 
as a whole. There are significant reactions to events 2 and 4 differing in sign and in 
extent for each company. Consequently, the first hypothesis that the defense stocks 
do not react to the Kosovo War can be rejected. 
 
5.2.2 Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 3 
 
In order to test the second and third hypotheses, for which events the 
comparisons will be made must be determined. Table 13 is a summary of Table 12 
for the portfolios. It shows the percentage of the companies that reacted negatively. 
 
Table 13 
% Negative Reaction of Portfolios 
 
Event U.S. Firms European Firms Aerospace Firms Other Firms 
1 89% 71% 63% 85% 
2 40% 69% 67% 45% 
4 53% 41% 38% 58% 
9 8% 19% 32% 5% 
 
Table 13 shows that there is no homogeneity in the reactions of portfolios for 
events 2 and 4. So it will not be healthy to include these events for testing the 
average effects. Besides, Table 13 presents that the reactions of the portfolios to 
event 1 are negative and contrary to the expectations that war-related events affect 
defense stocks positively. As a result, event 9 is chosen to test the second and third 
hypotheses. 
The second hypothesis of this study states that the average reactions of U.S. 
defense companies are equal to the average reactions of European defense companies 
during Kosovo War. 
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Table 14 
Results of JSR Test and Average Effect Test of MVRM for Event 9 
 
  U.S. Firms European Firms Aerospace Firms Other Firms 
JSR Test CAR 0.046 0.023 0.030 0.040 
 t-st.    3.61***  1.93**   3.34***   3.70*** 
Avg. Test of MVRM Wald 22.42 11.29 13.63 27.64 
 P 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
**  Significant at the 5 percent level 
Wald test is distributed as chi-square with 34, 22, 18 and 38 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 14 shows the results of JSR test and average effect test of MVRM for 
event 9. As mentioned before, both of these methods test the hypothesis that average 
reaction of firms in each portfolio equals zero. According to table, both tests show 
that the U.S. firms portfolio reacted positively and significantly to event 9 at the 0.01 
level. The reaction of the European firms portfolio is significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 
levels for JSR test and average reaction test of MVRM, respectively. 
Table 14 shows that, as expected, the CARs of the U.S. firms portfolio is 
higher than the CARs of the European firms portfolio. CARs for U.S. firms and 
European firms are 0.046 and 0.023, respectively. In order to see if the difference is 
significant, two-sample t-test and MVRM test are employed. So, Table 15 shows that 
the hypothesis that the CARs of U.S. defense companies are equal to the CARs of 
European defense companies during event 9 can be rejected at the 0.01 significance 
level. A similar hypothesis that average abnormal returns of U.S. firms portfolio 
equal to those of European firms during event 9 can be rejected at the 0.01 level as a 
result of MVRM test. 
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Table 15 
Results for the Comparison of U.S. and European Firms’ Reactions  
 
t-Test Results for CARs: 
  US EURO 
Mean 0.0457 0.0230 
Variance 0.0008 0.0007 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
t Stat (two-tail) 3.09  
P 0.00  
   
MVRM Result for Average Abnormal Returns are Equal:  
   
Chi2(1) = 4.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
 
Although there are political reasons for different reactions of the U.S. and 
European firms portfolios, market values, sales and profits of these two portfolios are 
also compared. Table 16 shows the results for market value comparison of portfolios. 
Table 16 shows that market values of U.S. firms are significantly higher than 
European firms market values. This can be also interpreted as another source of the 
difference in reactions. Because there is not any significant difference is in sales and 
profits of these portfolios, those comparisons are not reported.  
 
 
 
Table 16 
Results for Market Value Comparison of U.S. and European Firms Portfolios 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
   
  US EUROPE 
Mean 11.65 2.26 
Variance 112.3 25.7 
Observations 34 22 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Df 33  
t Stat (two-tail) 1.62  
P 0.05  
     Mean and variances are in billion dollars 
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The third hypothesis of this study states that the average reaction of the 
aerospace industry companies is equal to the average reaction of the non-aerospace 
companies during the Kosovo War. 
According to Table 14, both tests show that the aerospace firms portfolio 
reacted positively and significantly to event 9 at the 0.01 level. Table 14 shows that 
the reaction of the non-aerospace firms portfolio is found significant at the 0.01 level 
for event 9 in with both tests. In Table 14, the CARs of aerospace and non-aerospace 
firms are 0.030 and 0.040 respectively. The third hypothesis that average abnormal 
returns of aerospace companies are equal to the average abnormal returns of other 
defense companies. 
 
 
Table 17 
Results for the Comparison of Aerospace and Other Firms’ Reactions  
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  
  AERO OTHER 
Mean 0.0304 0.0398 
Variance 0.0007 0.0009 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
T Stat (two-tail) -1.19  
P 0.12  
   
MVRM Result for Average Abnormal Returns are Equal  
   
Chi2(1) = 1.57 
Prob > chi2 = 0.21 
 
 
Table 17 shows the results for the comparison of the aerospace firms 
portfolio and other firms portfolio. Contrary to our expectations, the CARs of non-
aerospace firms portfolio is higher than those of the aerospace firms portfolio, but the 
difference between the reaction of these portfolios to event 9 is insignificant. MVRM 
test confirms this result. So the hypothesis that average abnormal returns of 
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aerospace companies are equal to the average abnormal returns of other defense 
companies cannot be rejected. Because there is no significant difference between 
reactions of these two portfolios, firm characteristics, which are market values, sales 
and profits are not compared. 
In the tests of the second and third hypotheses, univariate tests are employed. 
In order to confirm the results of those tests, a regression model is employed. In the 
regression model, CAR is are taken as the dependent variable. Country of origin, 
sector, market values and profits are chosen as independent variables. Country of 
origin and sector are dummy variables. Country of origin dummy equals one for U.S. 
firms and zero for European firms. Sector dummy equals one for the aerospace firms 
and zero for the non-aerospace firms. 
 
Table 18 
Regression Results For Comparisons 
 
Model: CAR = α + β1 Country + β2 Sector + β3 Market Value + β4 Profit 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant  0.00  3.31*** 
Country  0.43  3.18*** 
Sector -0.03 -0.21 
Market Value  0.27  2.07** 
Profit  0.06  0.40 
             *** Significant at the 1 percent level 
          **   Significant at the 5 percent level 
     
Table 18 shows the regression results for comparisons. The coefficient of the 
country of origin variable is positive and significant at the 0.01 level, meaning that 
U.S. firms realize higher CARs. The coefficient of market value is also positive and 
significant, showing that the firms with higher market values have higher CARs. The 
coefficients of the sector dummy and profit are found insignificant. So these results 
confirm the results of the second and third hypotheses testings. 
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To sum up, the defense companies reacted to several unexpected events 
during the period between the first meeting on the Kosovo conflict and the last day of 
The Kosovo War. The reactions change in sign and in extent for each event and each 
firm. A specific event, the Serbia’s attack to Albania, to which majority of the firms 
in the sample showed positive reaction is examined in detail. The results show that 
there is a significant difference in average reactions of U.S. firms and European firms 
portfolios. However, the difference in average reactions of aerospace firms and other 
firms portfolios is not significant.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study explores the impacts of the Kosovo War on the NATO countries’ 
defense industry stocks by examining abnormal returns with three different models; 
standard event study methodology, Jaffe Standard Residual Test, and Multivariate 
Regression Model. It confirms the findings of previous studies stating that war-
related events positively affect defense industry stocks. Furthermore, the study 
extends the analysis to find whether certain stocks are more responsive to the Kosovo 
War. 
The poor performance of defense stocks relative to the market characterizes 
the period of time used in the analysis. The returns of these stocks increase by the 
effect of the Kosovo War. After the end of the Kosovo War, the decline in defense 
industry continues. 
The data confirms that it is inappropriate to employ standard event study 
methodology when there are event clustering and industry clustering. The 
correlations between abnormal returns and t-test results confirm this issue. 
Out of many possibly unexpected events, the defense stocks reacted 
positively and significantly to the Serbia’s attack to Albania on the seventeenth day 
of the Kosovo War. 
The study shows that there is a significant difference between the average 
abnormal returns of the U.S. defense stocks and European defense stocks for the 
Serbia’s attack to Albania, consistent with the expectations. Moreover, the study 
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provides evidence that there is a significant difference between the market values of 
these two portfolios for period of Kosovo War. 
However the analysis proved that there is no significant difference between 
the abnormal returns of aerospace stocks and non-aerospace defense stocks. 
There are some limitations of this study. First, the impacts of firm specific 
events that happened during the event windows are ignored. These specific events 
such as earning announcements, might affect the returns on individual firms. Second, 
limitation is the lack of some accounting data such as research and development 
expenditure, which was proved a significant explanatory variable, to explain the 
differences in reactions of the securities. 
Defense is not like any other industry. Its output is used for killing and 
destruction in the name of deterrence. There must be conflicts for demand of the 
defense products. This study, like other studies examining the impacts of war-related 
events, shows that defense companies benefit from wars and conflicts. 
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